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Abstract
It is well-known that a market equilibrium with uniform prices often does not exist in
non-convex day-ahead electricity auctions. We consider the case of the non-convex, uniform-
price Pan-European day-ahead electricity market ”PCR” (Price Coupling of Regions), with
non-convexities arising from so-called complex and block orders. Extending previous results,
we propose a new primal-dual framework for these auctions, which has applications in both
economic analysis and algorithm design. The contribution here is threefold. First, from the
algorithmic point of view, we give a non-trivial exact (i.e. not approximate) linearization of
a non-convex ’minimum income condition’ that must hold for complex orders arising from
the Spanish market, avoiding the introduction of any auxiliary variables, and allowing us
to solve market clearing instances involving most of the bidding products proposed in PCR
using off-the-shelf MIP solvers. Second, from the economic analysis point of view, we give
the first MILP formulations of optimization problems such as the maximization of the traded
volume, or the minimization of opportunity costs of paradoxically rejected block bids. We first
show on a toy example that these two objectives are distinct from maximizing welfare. We
also recover directly a previously noted property of an alternative market model. Third, we
provide numerical experiments on realistic large-scale instances. They illustrate the efficiency
of the approach, as well as the economics trade-offs that may occur in practice.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Equilibrium in non-convex day-ahead electricity auctions
An extensive literature now exists on non-convex day-ahead electricity markets or electricity pools,
dealing in particular with market equilibrium issues in the presence of indivisibilities, see e.g.
[3, 4, 5, 11, 10, 13, 14, 15] and references therein. Research on the topic has been fostered
by the ongoing liberalization and integration of electricity markets around the world during the
past two decades. As electricity cannot be efficiently stored, non-convexities of production sets
cannot be neglected, and bids introducing non-convexities in the mathematical formulation of
the market clearing problem have been proposed for many years by most of power exchanges or
electricity pools, allowing participants to reflect more accurately their operational constraints and
cost structure.
It is now well known that due to these non-convexities, a market equilibrium with uniform prices
may fail to exist (a single price per market area and time slot, no transfer payments, no losses
incurred, and no excess demand nor excess supply for the given uniform market prices). To deal
with this issue, almost all ideas proposed revolve around reaching back, or getting close to a
convex situation where strong duality holds and shadow prices exist. For example, a now classic
proposition in [11] is to fix integer variables to optimal values for a welfare maximizing primal
program whose constraints describe physically feasible dispatches of electricity, and compute multi-
part equilibrium prices using dual variables of these fixing constraints. The same authors, in
an unpublished working paper, have later adapted this proposition to the context of European
power auctions, proposing to allow and compensate so-called paradoxically accepted block bids,
thus deviating from a pure uniform price system. We review their proposition in section 4. A
recent proposition for electricity pools in [13] is to use a ’primal-dual’ formulation (i.e. involving
both executed quantities as primal variables, and market clearing prices as dual variables), where
’getting close’ is materialized by minimising the duality gap introduced by integer constraints, and
where additional constraints are added to ensure that producers are recovering their costs. The
goal is to use uniform prices, while minimizing the inevitable deviation from market equilibrium,
and providing adequate incentives to producers.
These last conditions, which have been used in Spain for many years, are usually called ’minimum
income conditions’ (MIC). The natural way to model them is through imposing a lower bound
on the revenue expressed as the product between executed quantities and market prices, yielding
non-convex quadratic constraints. However, [12] propose an exact linearization of the revenue
related to a set of bids of a strategic bidder participating to a convex market, relying on KKT
conditions explicitly added to model the lower-level market clearing problem of a bilevel program,
and linearized by introducting auxiliary binary variables.
Regarding the proposition in [13], a market equilibrium exists only if the optimal duality gap
is null, which is rarely the case with real instances, and the proposition choose not to enforce
network equilibrium conditions (corresponding to optimality conditions of transmission system
operators), nor that demand bids are not loosing money. The same remarks apply to [2], where
as non-convexities, only the minimum income conditions for producers are considered (not the
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indivisibilities).
Several other auction designs have been previously considered, which often propose to implement
a non-uniform pricing scheme, see e.g. [13] for a review.
The fact that equilibrium is not enforced for the convex part of the market clearing problem (i.e.
for convex bids and the network model), is a key auction design difference compared with the
choices made by power exchanges in Europe. In this article, we deal mainly with this last market
model, which is further described in the next section, and illustrated in the toy example given in
section 2.1.
1.2 The PCR market
We consider the Pan-European day-head electricity market being developed under the Price Cou-
pling of Regions project (PCR), as publicly described in [1]. Essentially, it is a near-equilibrium
auction mechanism using uniform prices, and where the only deviations from a perfect market
equilibrium is the allowance of so-called ”paradoxically rejected non-convex bids” to which oppor-
tunity costs are hence incurred, because these bids, which are ’in-the-money’, would be profitable
for the computed clearing prices, see [1]. On the other side, all convex bids as well as TSOs must
be ’at equilibrium’ for the computed market clearing prices. This integrated market is coupling the
CWE region (France, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Luxembourg) with NordPool (Norway,
Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Baltic countries), as well as Italy and OMIE (Spain, Portugal).
From the algorithmic point of view, when considering specifically the CWE region, we have pre-
viously shown that the market clearing problem can be restated as a MILP, without introducing
any auxiliary variables to linearise the needed complementarity conditions modelling the near-
equilibrium [5]. We also proposed a Benders-like decomposition procedure with locally strenght-
ened Benders cuts. Leaving aside a peculiar kind of bids from the Italian market (so-called PUN
bids), introducing complex bids with a MIC condition yields a non-convexMINLP. The production-
quality algorithm in use, EUPHEMIA ([1]), an extension of COSMOS previously used to clear
the CWE market, is a sophisticated branch-and-cut algorithm handling all market requirements.
However, due to the introduction of MIC bids, the algorithm is a heuristic, though COSMOS on
which it relies is an exact branch-and-cut.
1.3 Contribution and structure of this article
We provide here a new primal-dual framework for PCR-like auctions, which is mainly a contin-
uation of ideas presented in [4, 5]. The objective is to present a unified approach to algorithmic
and economic modelling issues concerning these European auctions, with useful computational
applications. The approach essentially consists in using strong duality adequately to enforce com-
plementarity conditions modelling equilibrium for the convex part of the market clearing problem,
as required by European power exchanges. This approach is similar to the bilevel approach sug-
gested in [15], though we do not need to introduce any auxiliary variables to linearize quadratic
terms when considering the equality of objective functions modelling optimality of the second level
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problem (i.e. equilibrium for the convex part). Moreover, we could choose to consider some ad-
ditional continuous variables with clear economic interpretations as bounds on opportunity costs
or losses of (non-convex) block bids. This approach is used in [5] to derive a powerful Benders
decomposition, and also shows how to consider the case of piecewise linear bid curves yielding a
QP setting, using strong duality for convex quadratic programs. The MIP framework proposed
here is presented in section 2. It includes the following extensions.
First, so-called complex bids used in Spain and Portugal are added to the model, and we give an
exact (i.e. not approximate) linearisation of a non-linear non-convex ’minimum income condition’
(MIC) that must hold for these bids ([1]), which model revenue adequacy for producers. As
mentioned above, this kind of conditions is provided for many years by the Spanish power exchange
OMIE ([6]), and is also considered (in a different auction design setting) in [2, 13]. This enables us
to give a MILP formulation of the PCR market clearing problem which avoids complementarity
constraints and the use of any auxiliary variables, while taking into account these MIC conditions.
This is developed in section 3.
Second, we show in section 2 how to consider in the main MILP model, aside main decision
variables such as prices and bid execution levels, additional variables which correspond to upper
bounds on opportunity costs of block bids, and upper bounds on losses. Let us emphasize that
current European market rules forbid paradoxically accepted block bids (executed bids incurring
losses), and stating these particular conditions amount to requiring that some of the added vari-
ables must be null. This is used in section 4 to develop economic analysis applications. For
example, the framework can be used in particular to provide the first (and reasonably tractable)
MILP formulations of optimization problems such as the minimization of incurred opportunity
costs, or the maximization of the traded volume. Let us note that in a convex context, no oppor-
tunity costs are incurred and any market clearing solution is welfare maximizing, so maximizing
the traded volume only amounts to choose peculiar tie-breaking rules in case of indeterminacy.
Yet it is shown on the toy example in the introductory section 2.1 that in a non-convex context,
these two objectives are both distinct from maximizing welfare. To our knowledge, if opportunity
costs of rejected block bids have been considered empirically in the past (e.g in [7, 8]), this point
is new and could provide useful information to day-ahead auctions stakeholders. (We have pre-
sented partial results about opportunity costs in a simplified setting at the EEM 14 conference,
see [4].) Also, still using the added variables, we recover and present in a novel way properties of
an alternative market model proposed in [10].
Finally, numerical experiments done on realistic large-scale instances are presented in section 5.
They show that our proposition allows to solve up to optimality market clearing instances with MIC
bids, which correspond to the Spanish market design. This is the first time that real-life instances
of this type of problems are solved to optimality. This straightforward approach does not behave
as well for instances including both MIC and block bids. However, a simple heuristic approach
already yields provably high-quality solutions. Regarding the economic analysis applications,
results presented illustrate the trade-offs that may occur for realistic large-scale instances, for
example between optimizing welfare and optimizing the traded volume. Again this is the first
time that optimal solutions for these problems can be computed apart form toy examples of small
sizes.
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2 A new primal-dual framework
Below, section 2.1 describes the context and issues for day-ahead markets with indivisibilities such
as in the CWE region (with block bids). Then, section 2.2 introduces the welfare maximization
problem without equilibrium restrictions, i.e. neglecting adequate market clearing prices existence
issues. Section 2.3 derives a related dual program parametrized by the integer decisions, and
several important economic interpretations relating dual variables, uniform prices and deviations
from a perfect market equilibrium (losses and opportunity costs of executed/rejected non-convex
bids). Finally, section 2.4 presents the basis of the new primal-dual framework proposed.
2.1 Uniform prices and price-based decisions in the CWE region: a toy
example
We use here a toy example ([4]) illustrating two key points. First, a market equilibrium may
not exist in the presence of indivisible orders. Second, under European market rules where para-
doxically rejected non-convex bids are allowed, a welfare maximizing solution is not necessarily a
traded volume maximizing solution nor it is necessarily an opportunity costs minimizing solution.
The toy example consists in a market clearing instance involving two demand continuous bids (e.g.
two steps of a stepwise demand bid curve), and two sell block bids. Parameters are summarized
in Table 1 :
Bids Power (MW) Limit price (EUR/MW)
A: Buy bid 1 11 50
B: Buy bid 2 14 10
C: Sell block bid 1 10 5
D: Sell block bid 2 20 10
Table 1: Toy market clearing instance
First, obviously, it is not possible to execute both sell block bids, as they offer a total amount of
power of 30 MW, while the total demand is at most 25 MW. As they are indivisible, if there is
a trade, either (i) bid C is fully executed or (ii) bid D is fully executed. Second, at equilibrium,
by definition, for the given market prices, no bidder should prefer another level of execution of its
bid. In particular, in-the-money (ITM) bids must be fully executed, out-of-the-money (OTM) bids
must be fully rejected, and fractionally executed bids must be right at-the-money (ATM).
So in the first case (i), A is partially accepted and set the market clearing price to 50 EUR/MW,
if any equilibrium with uniform prices exists. But in that case, block bid D is rejected while ITM:
an opportunity cost of 20(50− 10) = 800 is incurred. This situation is accepted under the near-
equilibrium European market rules described above. A direct computation shows that the welfare
is then equal to 10(50-50) + 10(50-5) = 450, while the traded volume is 10. Similar computations
in the case (ii) yield the market outcome summarized in Table 2.
In this toy example, case (i) maximizes welfare but generates (much) more opportunity costs and
half the traded volume.
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• Price Traded Volume Welfare Opportunity costs
Matching C 50 10 450 800
Matching D 10 20 440 50
Table 2: Market outcome
2.2 Unrestricted welfare optimization
We formulate here the classical welfare optimization problem with an abstract and very general
power transmission network representation that is still linear. It covers e.g. DC network flow
models or the so-called ATC and Flow-based models used in PCR (see [1]). The usual network
equilibrium conditions involving locational market prices apply, see [5].
Binary variables uc are introduced to model the conditional acceptance of a set of hourly bids
hc ∈ Hc, controlled via constraints (4). The conditional acceptance relative to a minimum income
condition is dealt with in section 3.
Notation
Notation used throughout the text is provided here for quick reference. The interpretation of any
other symbol is given within the text itself.
Sets and indices:
i Index for hourly bids, in set I
j Index for block bids, in set J
c Index for MIC bids, in set C
hc Index for hourly bids associated to the MIC bid c, in set Hc
l Index for locations, l(i) (resp. l(hc)) denotes the location of bid i (resp. hc)
t Index for time slots, t(i) (resp. t(hc)) denotes the time slot of bid i, (resp. hc)
Ilt ⊆ I Subset of hourly bids associated to location l and time slot t
HClt ⊆ HC Subset of MIC hourly suborders, associated to location l and time slot t
Jl ⊆ J Subset of block bids associated to location l
Parameters:
Pi, Phc Power amount of hourly bid i (resp. hc),
P < 0 for sell bids, and P > 0 for demand bids
P tj Power amount of block bid j at time t, same sign convention
λi, λhc Limit bid price of hourly bid i, hc
λj Limit bid price of block bid j
am,k Abstract linear network representation parameters
Primal decision variables:
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xi ∈ [0, 1] fraction of power Pi which is executed
xhc ∈ [0, 1] fraction of power Phc (related to the MIC bid c) which is executed
yj ∈ {0, 1} binary variable which determines if the quantities P
t
j are fully accepted or rejected
uc ∈ {0, 1} binary variable controling the execution or rejection of the MIC bid c
(i.e. of the values of xhc)
nk variables used for the abstract linear network representation, related to net export positions
Dual decision variables:
pilt uniform price (locational marginal price) for power in location l and time slot t
vm ≥ 0 dual variable pricing the network constraint m,
si ≥ 0 dual variable interpretable as the surplus associated to the execution of bid i ∈ I
sj ≥ 0 dual variable interpretable as the surplus associated to the execution of bid j ∈ J
shc ≥ 0 dual variable interpretable as the (potential) surplus associated to the execution of bid hc
sc ≥ 0 dual variable interpretable as the surplus associated to the execution of the MIC bid c
max
x,y,u,n
∑
i
(λiPi)xi +
∑
c,h∈Hc
(λhcPhc)xhc +
∑
j,t
(λjP tj )yj (1)
subject to:
xi ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ I [si] (2)
yj ≤ 1 ∀j ∈ J [sj ] (3)
xhc ≤ uc ∀h ∈ Hc, c ∈ C [shc] (4)
uc ≤ 1 ∀c ∈ C[sc] (5)
∑
i∈Ilt
Pixi +
∑
j∈Jl
P tj yj +
∑
hc∈HClt
Phcxhc
=
∑
k
ekl,tnk, ∀(l, t) [pil,t] (6)
∑
k
am,knk ≤ wm ∀m ∈ N [vm] (7)
x, y, u ≥ 0, (8)
y, u ∈ Z (9)
Constraint (6) is the balance equation at location l at time t. Constraint (7) is the capacity
constraint of network element m.
2.3 Duality, uniform prices and opportunity costs
Let us now consider partitions J = Jr ∪ Ja, C = Cr ∪Ca, and the following constraints, fixing all
integer variables to some arbitrarily given values:
− yja ≤ −1 ∀ja ∈ Ja ⊆ J [d
a
ja
] (10)
yjr ≤ 0 ∀jr ∈ Jr ⊆ J [d
r
jr
] (11)
− uca ≤ −1 ∀ca ∈ Ca ⊆ C[du
a
ca
] (12)
ucr ≤ 0 ∀cr ∈ Cr ⊆ C[du
r
cr
] (13)
Dropping integer constraints (9) not needed any more, this yields an LP whose dual is:
min
∑
i
si +
∑
j
sj +
∑
c
sc +
∑
m
wmvm −
∑
ja∈Ja
daja −
∑
ca∈Ca
daca (14)
subject to:
si + Pipil(i),t(i) ≥ Piλ
i, ∀i [xi] (15)
shc + Phcpil(hc),t(hc) ≥ Phcλ
hc, ∀h ∈ Hc, c [xhc] (16)
sjr + d
r
jr
+
∑
t
P tjrpil(jr),t ≥ Pjrλ
jr , ∀jr ∈ Jr[yjr ] (17)
sja − d
a
ja
+
∑
t
P tjapil(ja),t ≥ Pjaλ
ja , ∀ja ∈ Ja [yja ] (18)
scr + du
r
cr
≥
∑
h∈Hcr
shcr , ∀cr ∈ Cr [ucr ] (19)
sca − du
a
ca
≥
∑
h∈Hca
shca , ∀ca ∈ Ca [uca ] (20)
∑
m
am,kvm −
∑
l,t
ekl,tpil,t = 0 ∀k ∈ K [nk] (21)
si, sj , sc, shc, d
r
jr
, daja , du
r
cr
, duaca , vm ≥ 0 (22)
We now write down the complementarity constraints corresponding to these primal an dual pro-
grams parametrized by the integer decisions. Economic interpretations are stated afterwards:
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si(1− xi) = 0 ∀i ∈ I (23)
sj(1 − yj) = 0 ∀j ∈ J (24)
shc(uc − xhc) = 0 ∀h, c (25)
sc(1− uc) = 0 ∀c ∈ C (26)
vm(
∑
k
am,knk − wm) = 0 ∀m ∈ N (27)
(1 − yja)d
a
ja
= 0 ∀ja ∈ Ja (28)
yjrd
r
jr
= 0 ∀jr ∈ Jr (29)
(1 − uc1)du
a
c1
= 0 ∀c1 ∈ C1 (30)
ucrdu
r
cr
= 0 ∀cr ∈ Cr (31)
xi(si + Pipil(i),t(i) − Piλ
i) = 0 ∀i ∈ I (32)
xhc(shc + Phcpil(hc),t(hc) − Phcλ
hc) = 0 ∀h, c (33)
yjr (sjr + d
r
jr
+
∑
t
P tjr (pil(jr),t − λ
jr )) = 0 ∀jr ∈ Jr (34)
yja(sja − d
a
ja
+
∑
t
P tja(pil(ja),t − λ
ja )) = 0 ∀ja ∈ Ja (35)
ucr(scr + du
r
cr
−
∑
h∈Hcr
shcr) = 0 ∀cr ∈ Cr (36)
uca(sca − du
a
ca
−
∑
h∈Hca
shca) = 0 ∀ca ∈ Ca (37)
Lemma 1 (Economic interpretation of da, dr [4]). Take a pair of points (x, y, u, n) and (s, pil,t, d
a, dr, dua, dur)
respectively satisfying primal conditions (2)-(13) and dual conditions (15)-(22), such that comple-
mentarity constraints (23)-(37) are satisfied. For the uniform prices pil,t: (i) d
a
ja
is an upper bound
on the actual loss (if any) min[0,
∑
t
P tja(λ
ja − pil(ja),t)] of the executed block order ja, (ii) d
r
jr
is
an upper bound on the opportunity cost max[0,
∑
t
P tjr (λ
jr − pil(jr),t)] of the rejected order jr.
Proof. (i) Conditions (35) show that for an accepted block yja = 1, we have sja−d
a
ja
=
∑
t
P tja(λ
ja−
pil(ja),t), the right-hand side corresponding to the gain (if positive) or loss (if negative) of the bid.
As sja ≥ 0, the loss is bounded by d
a
ja
.
(ii) For a rejected block bid, yjr = 0, and conditions (24) imply sjr = 0, which used in dual
conditions (17) directly yields the result, as drjr ≥ 0.
The following lemma proposes analogous interpretations for the case of MIC orders. Intuitively,
neglecting for now the so-called MIC condition, the shadow cost of forcing a MIC order to be
rejected (given by dur) is at least equal to the sum of all maximum missed surpluses generated by
its hourly suborders at the given market prices, while there is no ’shadow cost’ at forcing it to be
accepted (its suborders are then cleared using standard rules for hourly bids):
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Lemma 2 (Interpretation of dua, dur). (i) durcr is an upper bound on the sum of maximum missed
individual hourly surpluses
∑
h∈Hcr
(max[0, Phcr(λ
hcr − pil(hcr),t(hcr))]) of the rejected MIC order cr.
(ii) We can always assume duaca = 0, ∀ca ∈ Ca.
Proof. (i) Conditions of type (26) show that scr = 0, while (16) and (22) give shcr ≥ max[0, Phcr(λ
hcr−
pil(hcr),t(hcr))]. Using these two facts in (19) provides the result.
(ii) As ∀h ∈ Hc, shc ≥ 0, using (20), it follows that ∀ca ∈ Ca, sca − du
a
ca
≥ 0. Then, we can
pose ˜duaca := 0 and make a change of variable ˜sca := sca − du
a
ca
in (2)-(37) (systems of conditions
equivalent in the usual sense).
2.4 The new primal-dual framework
This new ’primal-dual approach’ makes use of an equality of objective functions (39) to enforce
all the economically meaningful complementarity conditions (23)-(37). Leaving aside for the time
being the question of MIC bid selections, which are dealt with in section 3, the problem is that we
don’t know a priori what is the best block bid selection J = Jr∪Ja. However, the feasible set UMFS
described below allows to determine the optimal block bid selection, whatever the desired objective
function is, and the pair of optimal points for the corresponding primal and dual programs stated
above. This is formalised in Theorem 1 and helps to consider many interesting issues (welfare
or traded volume maximization, minimization of opportunity costs, etc), in a computationally
efficient way. This is also a key step towards the main extension presented in next section,
proposing an exact linearisation to deal with MIC bids using a MILP formulation.
In theory, admissible market clearing prices may lie outside the price range allowed for bids, see
[9]. For modelling purposes, we need to include the following technical constraint limiting the
market price range
pil,t ∈ [−p¯i, p¯i] ∀l ∈ L, t ∈ T. (38)
p¯i can be choosen large enough to avoid excluding any relevant market clearing solution (see [5]).
Note that in practice, power exchanges actually do impose that the computed prices pil,t stay
within a given range in order to limit market power and price volatility.
Uniform Market Clearing Feasible Set (UMFS):
∑
i
(λiPi)xi +
∑
c,h∈Hc
(λhcPhc)xhc +
∑
j,t
(λjP tj )yj
≥
∑
i
si +
∑
j
sj +
∑
c
sc −
∑
j∈J
daj +
∑
m
wmvm (39)
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xi ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ I[si] (40)
yj ≤ 1 ∀j ∈ J [sj ] (41)
xhc ≤ uc ∀h ∈ Hc, c ∈ C [shc] (42)
uc ≤ 1 ∀c ∈ C[sc] (43)
∑
i∈Ilt
Pixi +
∑
j∈Jl
P tj yj +
∑
hc∈HClt
Phcxhc
=
∑
k
ekl,tnk, ∀(l, t) [pil,t] (44)
∑
k
am,knk ≤ wm ∀m ∈ N [vm] (45)
x, y, u ≥ 0, (46)
y, u ∈ Z (47)
si + Pipil(i),t(i) ≥ Piλ
i, ∀i [xi] (48)
shc + Phcpil(hc),t(hc) ≥ Phcλ
hc, ∀h ∈ Hc, c [xhc] (49)
sj + d
r
j − d
a
j +
∑
t
P tj pil(j),t ≥ Pjλ
j , ∀j ∈ J [yj ] (50)
(sc + du
r
c) ≥
∑
h∈Hc
shc ∀c ∈ C[uc] (51)
drj ≤Mj(1− yj) ∀j ∈ J (52)
durc ≤Mc(1 − uc) ∀c ∈ C (53)
daj ≤Mj yj ∀j ∈ J (54)
duac = 0 ∀c ∈ C (55)∑
m
am,kvm −
∑
l,t
ekl,tpil,t = 0 ∀k ∈ K[nk] (56)
si, sj , sc, shc, d
a, dr, dua, dur, vm ≥ 0 (57)
Constants Mj are choosen large enough in Constraints (52), (54) so that Constraints (50) are
not restraining the range [−p¯i, p¯i] of possible values for pil,t (or the possibility to paradoxically
reject and accept block bids). They must indeed correspond to the maximum opportunity cost
in conditions (52), or loss in conditions (54), that could be incurred to a block bid, for clearing
prices in the allowed range. For this purpose, assuming that both the bid and market clearing
prices satisfy (38), it is sufficient to set Mj := K
∑
t
|P tj | with K = 2p¯i. This value of K could be
improved. For example, in constraints (52), one could set K := (p¯i − λj) for a sell block bid, and
K := (λj − (−p¯i)) for a buy block bid. Values of the Mc are determined similarly with respect to
(53) and condition (51): they must be such that the value of sc can be null whatever the values
of the shc are. Economically, the surplus sc of a rejected MIC bid will be null even if the potential
surpluses shc of its suborders are not.
Also, we have made use of Lemma 2 to set, without loss of generality, all the variables duac := 0
in UMFS. This is clarified in the proof of Theorem 1.
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Theorem 1. (I) Let (x, y, u, n, pi, v, s, da, dr, dua, dur) be any feasible point of UMFS satisfying
the price range condition (38), and let us define Jr = {j|yj = 0}, Ja = {j|yj = 1}, Cr = {c|uc =
0}, Ca = {c|uc = 1}.
Then the projection (x, y, u, n, pi, v, s, daja∈Ja , d
r
jr∈Jr , du
a
ca∈Ca , du
r
cr∈Cr) satisfies all conditions in
(2)-(37).
(II) Conversely, any point
MCS = (x, y, u, n, pi, v, s, daja∈Ja , d
r
jr∈Jr , du
a
ca∈Ca , du
r
cr∈Cr) feasible for constraints (2)-(37) re-
lated to a given arbitrary block order selection J = Jr ∪ Ja and MIC selection C = Cr ∪ Ca
which respects the price range condition (38) can be ‘lifted’ to obtain a feasible point ˜MCS =
(x, y, u, n, pi, v, s˜, d˜a, d˜r, ˜dua, ˜dur) of UMFS.
Proof. See appendix.
3 Including MIC bids
3.1 Complex orders with a minimum income condition
A MIC order is basically a set of hourly orders with the classical clearing rules but with the
additional condition that a given ’minimum income condition’ must be satisfied. Otherwise, all
hourly bids associated to the given MIC bid are rejected, even if some of them are ITM. The
minimum income condition of the MIC order c ensures that some fixed cost Fc together with a
variable cost Vc ×Pc are recovered, where Pc is the total executed quantity related to the order c,
and Vc a given variable cost.
With the notation described in Section 2.2, the minimum income condition for a MIC bid indiced
by c has the form:
(uc = 1) =⇒
∑
h∈Hc
(−Phcxhc)pil(hc),t(hc) ≥ Fc +
∑
h∈Hc
(−Phcxhc)Vc, (58)
where Hc denotes the set of hourly orders associated with the MIC order c. The left-hand side
represents the total income related to order c, given the market prices pil,t and executed amount
of power
∑
h∈Hc
−Phcxhc, while the right-hand side corresponds to the fixed and variable costs
of production. At first sight, this condition is non-linear and non-convex, because of the terms
xhcpil(hc),t(hc) in the left-hand side.
In previous works, MIC constraints are either approximated, see [2, 13], or the full model is
decomposed and solved heuristically, as in the approach described in EUPHEMIA ([1]). More
specifically only the primal part (1)–(9) is considered in a master problem, and prices are computed
only when integer solutions are found. Let us however recall that [2, 13] on the one hand and
[1] on the other hand are considering distinct market models. We show in the next section how
MIC conditions can be linearized without approximation in the common European market model
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considered by [1]. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first exact linearisation proposed for
this type of conditions.
3.2 Exact linearization of the MIC conditions
The following lemma is the key reason for which it is possible to express the a priori non-linear
non-convex MIC condition (58) as a linear constraint. As we dispose in UMFS of both the surplus
variables sc and the contributions to welfare (Phcxhc)λ
hc, we can use them to express the income
in a linear way:
Lemma 3. Consider any feasible point of UMFS. Then, the following holds:
∀c ∈ C,
∑
h∈Hc
(Phcxhc)pil(hc),t(hc) =
∑
h∈Hc
(Phcλ
hc)xhc − sc (59)
Proof. We first define Cr and Ca as in Theorem 1. For cr ∈ Cr, the identity is trivially satisfied,
because if a MIC bid is rejected, all related hourly bids are rejected: ∀h ∈ Hcr , xhcr = 0, and on
the other side, scr = 0 because of complementarity constraints (26).
Let us now consider an accepted MIC bid ca ∈ Ca. We first show that the following identity holds:
(Phcaxhca)pil(hca),t(hca) = (Phcaλ
hca)xhca − shca (60)
Consider for xhca the following two possibilities, noting that uca = 1:
(a) if xhca = 0, the identity (60) is trivially satisfied, as shca = 0 according to complementarity
constraints (25).
(b) if 0 < xhca , (33) gives shca = Phcaλ
hca −Phcapil(hca),t(hca), so multiplying the equation by xhca
and using (25) guaranteeing shcaxhca = shcauca = shca , we get identity (60).
Summing up (60) over h ∈ Hca yields:
∑
h∈Hca
(Phcaxhca)pil(hca),t(hca) =
∑
h∈Hca
(Phcaλ
hca)xhca −
∑
hca
shca
Finally, using complementarity constraints (37), we get:
∑
h∈Hca
(Phcaxhca)pil(hca),t(hca) =
∑
h∈Hca
(Phcaλ
hca)xhca − (sca − du
a
ca
),
where duaca := 0 by Lemma 2 in the definition of UMFS, providing the required identity (59).
Using Lemma 3, the MIC condition (58) can be stated in a linear way as follows:
sc −
∑
h∈Hc
(Phcλ
hc)xhc ≥ Fc +
∑
h∈Hc
(−Phcxhc)Vc −Mc(1− uc) (61)
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where Mc is a fixed number large enough to deactivate the constraint when uc = 0. As uc = 0
implies sc = 0 and xhc = 0, we set Mc := Fc.
3.3 Welfare maximization with MIC bids, without any auxiliary vari-
ables
We propose here a formulation of the welfare maximization problem including MIC bids, avoiding
any auxiliary variables, by eliminating the variables da, dr, dur from the formulation UMFS.
Let us consider UMFS with the additional MIC conditions (61) for c ∈ C. We can make a first
simplification of the model by replacing both kinds of conditions (51), (53) by the conditions (74)
below. Also, under PCR market rules, as no bid can be paradoxically executed, according to
Lemma 1, we must set daj = 0, ∀j ∈ J . With this last conditions added, in the same way, we can
clean up the mathematical formulation by replacing (50) and (52) by conditions (73) below, as
well as removing constraints (54)-(55). This yields an equivalent MILP formulation without any
auxiliary variables, and in particular no more binary variables than the number of block and MIC
bids:
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PCR-FS
∑
i
(λiPi)xi +
∑
c,h∈Hc
(λhcPhc)xhc +
∑
j,t
(λjPj,t)yj
≥
∑
i
si +
∑
j
sj +
∑
c
sc +
∑
m
wmvm (62)
xi ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ I [si] (63)
yj ≤ 1 ∀j ∈ J [sj ] (64)
xhc ≤ uc ∀h ∈ Hc, c ∈ C [shc] (65)
uc ≤ 1 ∀c ∈ C[sc] (66)
∑
i∈Ilt
Pixi +
∑
j∈Jl
P tj yj +
∑
hc∈HClt
Phcxhc
=
∑
k
ekl,tnk, ∀(l, t) [pil,t] (67)
∑
k
am,knk ≤ wm ∀m ∈ N [vm] (68)
x, y, u ≥ 0, (69)
y, u ∈ Z (70)
si + Pipil(i),t(i) ≥ Piλ
i, ∀i [xi] (71)
shc + Phcpil(hc),t(hc) ≥ Phcλ
hc, ∀h ∈ Hc, c [xhc] (72)
sj +Mj(1− yj) +
∑
t
P tjpil(j),t ≥ Pjλ
j , ∀j ∈ J [yj ] (73)
sc +Mc(1− uc) ≥
∑
h∈Hc
shc ∀c ∈ C[uc] (74)
∑
m
am,kvm −
∑
l,t
ekl,tpil,t = 0 ∀k ∈ K[nk] (75)
sc −
∑
h∈Hc
(Phcλ
hc)xhc ≥
Fc +
∑
h∈Hc
(−Phcxhc)Vc −Mc(1− uc) ∀c ∈ C (76)
si, sj , sc, shc, d
r, dur, vm ≥ 0 (77)
The welfare optimization problem is then stated as follows:
max
PCR−FS
∑
i
(λiPi)xi +
∑
c,h∈Hc
(λhcPhc)xhc +
∑
j,t
(λjPj,t)yj (78)
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4 Using the framework for economic analysis purposes
4.1 Maximizing the traded volume
The following program aims at maximizing the traded volume under the same market rules:
max
PCR−FS
∑
i|Pi>0
Pixi +
∑
c,h∈Hc|Phc>0
Phcxhc +
∑
(j,t)|P t
j
>0
P tj yj (79)
An alternative formulation of the objective function is the following:
max
PCR−FS
1
2
(
∑
i
|Pi|xi +
∑
c,h∈Hc
|Phc|xhc +
∑
(j,t)
|P tj |yj) (80)
4.2 Minimizing opportunity costs of PRB
It suffices to consider the following objective function over UMFS and the additional constraints
daj = 0, ∀j J :
min
∑
j
drj (81)
Let us also note that constraints like (52) also allow to control which block bids could be para-
doxically rejected on an individual basis, or could also be used to forbid the paradoxical rejection
of bids which are too deeply in-the-money, by specifying a threshold via the values of Mj .
4.3 A short proof for a property of an alternative market model
The result below, first proposed in [10], basically states that (a) there is always enough welfare
to allow and compensate paradoxically accepted block bids (PAB), (b) allowing PAB generates
globally more welfare. We show how this can be derived almost directly from the proposed frame-
work, and we specify the decomposition of the welfare into the sum of (non-negative) individual
bid surpluses minus paid compensations to PAB, cf. the interpretation of the daj given in Lemma
1. Therefore, there is an incentive for market participants, globally, to allow and compensate
PAB:
Theorem 2. Let us denote UMFS2 the feasible set described by the constraints of UMFS (39)-
(57), together with the MIC constraints (61), and PCR-FS2 the same feasible set UMFS2 with the
additional constraints ∀j ∈ J, daj = 0 to forbid PAB. Then, trivially:
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1. For any feasible point of UMFS2 (resp. PCR-FS2):
∑
i
(λiPi)xi +
∑
c,h∈Hc
(λhcPhc)xhc +
∑
j,t
(λjPj,t)yj
=
∑
i
si +
∑
j
sj +
∑
c
sc +
∑
m
wmvm −
∑
j∈J
daj (82)
2.
0 ≤ max
PCR−FS2
∑
i
si +
∑
j
sj +
∑
c
sc +
∑
m
wmvm
≤ max
UMFS2
∑
i
si +
∑
j
sj +
∑
c
sc +
∑
m
wmvm −
∑
j∈J
daj (83)
Proof. 1. The first equality is a consequence of duality for linear programs.
2. As PCR− FS2 ⊆ UMFS2, and in PCR− FS2, ∀j ∈ J, daj = 0, the inequality follows.
5 Numerical Experiments
We provide here a proof-of-concept of the approach, presenting numerical experiments, using
realistic large-scale instances, on: (a) welfare maximization with MIC bids, (b) traded volume
maximisation under CWE rules (i.e. without MIC bids), and (c) opportunity costs minimization
also under CWE market rules. The models have been implemented in C++ using IBM ILOG
Concert Technology interfaced with R for input-output management as well as post-processing
analysis, and solved using CPLEX 12.5.1 using 4 threads on a platform with 2x Xeon X5650
(6 cores @ 2.66 GHz), 16 GB of RAM, running Fedora Linux 20. One potential advantage of
the new primal-dual approach is the possibility to benefit from parallel computing routines of
state-of-the-art solvers like CPLEX, without implementing further algorithmic work.
5.1 Welfare maximization with MIC bids
We first consider solving market instances with MIC bids only. The instances involve hourly bids
from four areas, one of these areas also containing MIC bids. Solving this kind of instances up
to optimality is tractable, see Table 3, though some instances are challenging from a numerical
stability point of view, due to the introduction of BigM’s. A particular care should be given to
solver’s tolerance parameters, e.g. integer feasibility tolerance. Heuristics and cuts have been here
deactivated, and the branching direction has been set to -1 (priority to the ’down branch’). The
idea is that priority must be given to eliminating as many MIC bids as needed to increase the prices
sufficiently to ensure enough income to the accepted ones. It should be noted that when discarding
the MIC conditions, no MIC bid is getting the minimum income required, certainly because in
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that (non-feasible) case, the overall offer formed by the hourly suborders is too important at low
marginal prices.
Let us emphasize that this new formulation provides dual LP bounds, and can be solved exactly by
state-of-the-art MIP solvers. To our knowledge, this is the first tractable exact approach proposed.
(Another, apparently non-tractable approach would be to proceed by decomposing the problem
and adding e.g. no-good cuts rejecting the current MIC bids selection when no admissible prices
exist, with a very slow convergence rate.)
#inst Run. Time (s.) Nodes Abs. Gap Rel. Gap #Houly bids # MIC bids
1 70 58 47107 70
2 274 896 49299 74
3 432 1111 48119 71
4 144 104 52434 72
5 37 19 41623 74
6 901 3238 1299754.97 0.04% 45371 69
7 22 23 36819 73
8 624 1055 53516 69
9 255 504 62770 76
10 216 418 45731 74
Table 3: Welfare optimization with MIC bids
Adding block bids render the problem much more difficult to solve. Solver’s parameters used are
the same as above. It turns out that many block bids are fractionally accepted in continuous
relaxations of the branch-and-cut tree. As a consequence, the first feasible solutions found are of
poor quality, with a few block and MIC bids accepted. Instead, as an easy-to-implement heuristic
approach, we first solve an instance with all block bids fixed to zero, and determine an admissible
MIC bids selection (ideally optimal for this subproblem). Second, we fix this MIC bids selection,
and introduce block bids, to determine a potentially very good solution to the initial problem.
It should be noted that a solution for this second stage always exists, as in the worst case, all
block bids could be rejected. Third, the obtained solution is used as a MIP start for the initial
model with both block and MIC bids. With this approach, the number of block bids accepted is
of the same order as when no MIC bids are considered besides, and the relative gap is improved,
compared to the basic approach of providing the solver with the formulation ’as is’. However the
absolute MIP gap remains substantial. Results are presented in Table 4, with a running time limit
of 900 seconds for each of the two first stages, and 1200 seconds for the last stage.
5.2 Traded volume maximization
To optimize the traded volume, welfare maximization itself turns out to be a useful heuristic.
We first solve this welfare maximization problem, and for the given optimal block bid selection,
maximize the traded volume (dealing with a possible indeterminacy of the traded volume for that
solution). We then use this solution as a MIP start for the initial problem. This helps in practice,
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#inst Nodes Abs. Gap Rel. Gap #Houly bids # MIC bids # Blocks bids
1 13214 1015887.92 0.04% 47107 70 502
2 7913 4129620.69 0.14% 49299 74 589
3 11375 2748987.16 0.12% 48119 71 516
4 2873 3009748.14 0.10% 52434 72 591
5 12213 1425671.83 0.05% 41623 74 588
6 6443 5999741.05 0.19% 45371 69 567
7 22250 337651.70 0.01% 36819 73 550
8 6925 4747440.57 0.19% 53516 69 691
9 3658 2937928.67 0.08% 62770 76 604
10 3194 3100317.15 0.12% 45731 74 537
Table 4: Welfare optimization with MIC and block bids
at least to provide a useful upper bound, even in some cases proving optimality of the welfare
maximizing solution for the traded volume maximization problem. We also observed that provided
the reasonably good solution obtained from maximizing welfare, well-known heuristics such as
’solution polishing’ in CPLEX could provide quickly better solutions. Therefore, this heuristic is
first applied when considering the second stage solving the initial traded volume maximization
problem itself, provided the solution obtained at the first stage. Table 5 summarizes the trade-off
between both kinds of objectives for ten instances corresponding to the belgian market.
Welf. max sol. Maximizing traded volume ∆ Vol. ∆ Welf. # Hourly # Blocks
# Max Trad. Vol. Max Trad. Vol. Best bound bids bids
1 24589.84 24589.84 24589.84 0.00 0.00 1939 54
2 25794.53 25928.19 26654.32 133.66 5672.35 1711 67
3 23633.48 23696.99 23696.99 63.51 171.40 1706 54
4 35137.32 35285.32 35285.32 148.00 4292.13 1893 56
5 21296.94 21433.08 21433.08 136.15 2460.55 1713 39
6 23361.72 23871.27 23871.27 509.55 56518.94 1700 46
7 23542.38 23679.64 23679.64 137.26 1877.94 1749 35
8 35974.15 36270.11 36270.11 295.96 21403.03 1533 58
9 24988.63 24988.63 24988.63 0.00 0.00 1787 33
10 35307.91 35507.32 37434.39 199.41 16082.15 1418 62
Table 5: Comparison of the maximum traded volume in both cases
For example, instances # 2 or # 3 show concrete examples where it is possible to obtain more
traded volume than when just optimizing welfare (as in the toy example presented above), the bet-
ter solution for # 3 even being proven optimal. Instance # 1 shows an example where the welfare
maximizing solution is proven optimal for the traded volume maximization problem. Sometimes
the traded volume can be significantly larger (2% or more), as in instance #6.
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5.3 Minimizing opportunity costs
We proceed as above, (a) first solving the welfare maximizing solution, (b) looking for the minimum
opportunity costs possible for this solution, and (c) use this solution as a start solution for the
proper opportunity costs minimization problem. Let us note that prices and opportunity costs
obtained from stage (b) can substantially differ from the prices computed in practice, as these
prices are determined in a different way from what is specified by tie breaking rules in case of
price/volume indeterminacy. Let us recall that welfare is uniquely determined by the block bid
selections and hence not affected by stage (b), see [5]. We also refer to [4] for a table showing
results for a few real CWE instances from 2011.
Results are given in Table 6. Optimal solutions are found in the majority of the instances (9 out of
10). Again, for example, instances # 1 or # 2 show that solutions to both problems do not coincide
in general (as in the toy example of section 2.1). Opportunity cost can sometimes be reduced by
75% or more, for example for instance #3. In the case of instances # 5 and # 9, the welfare
maximizing solution is proven optimal for the opportunity costs minimization problem.
W-MAXSOL Minimizing Opp. Costs ∆ OC. ∆ Welf. # Hourly # Blocks
# Min OC Min OC Best bound
1 13096.96 5624.37 5624.37 7472.58 2501.76 1939 54
2 6559.97 2124.96 2124.96 4435.01 963.19 1711 67
3 3913.16 978.61 978.61 2934.55 171.40 1706 54
4 483.71 348.00 348.00 135.71 138.65 1893 56
5 1715.30 1715.30 1715.30 0.00 0.00 1713 39
6 49366.33 46405.44 46405.44 2960.90 1577.61 1700 46
7 8771.51 8771.51 8771.51 0.00 0.00 1749 35
8 17249.96 7399.43 7399.43 9850.53 236.38 1533 58
9 256.81 256.81 256.81 0.00 0.00 1787 33
10 64777.46 61579.08 3198.25 3198.37 1591.57 1418 62
Table 6: Comparison of opportunity costs in both cases
6 Conclusions
The new primal-dual approach proposed here allows to derive powerful algorithmic tools as well
as enables to deal with economic issues of interest for day-ahead auctions stakeholders. We have
been able to give a MILP formulation of the market clearing problem in the presence of MIC
bids, avoiding the introduction of any auxiliary variables, relying on an exact linearisation of the
minimum income condition. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first tractable exact approach
proposed to deal with such kind of bids, and numerical experiments show good results, though
the approach is still challenging when both block and MIC bids are considered together. From
the economic analysis point of view, the approach allowed us to examine the trade-off occurring in
practice between different objectives such as welfare maximization, traded volume maximization,
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and minimization of opportunity costs of paradoxically rejected block bids. It also seems these are
the first tractable formulations proposed to examine these economic issues. The trade-offs for the
examined instances were rather small, though they could be more important in absolute terms if
the number and size of non-convex bids are allowed to increase. We also plan to release soon a
Julia package implementing the models and algorithms, to foster exchanges and provide adaptable
tools to the academic community working on related research topics.
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7 Omitted proofs in main text
Let us first consider the equality of primal an dual objective functions of section 2.2:
Observation 1. By strong duality for linear programs, for a pair of primal and dual feasible
points corresponding to a block bid selection and a MIC bid selection, i.e. satisfying respectively
(2)-(13) and (15)-(22), the complementarity constraints (23)-(37) hold if and only if we have the
equality (1) = (14).
7.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. We emphasize again, and use below, the fact that according to Lemma 2, we can assume
without loss of generality duaca = 0, ∀ca ∈ Ca in (14)-(22).
(I) Let MCS = (x, y, n, u, pi, v, s, da, dr, dua, dur) be a feasible point of UMFS and let us define
Jr := {j ∈ J |yj = 0}, Ja := {j ∈ J |yj = 1} and likewise for Cr, Ca with respect to the values of the
variables uc. Consider the projection ˜MCS = (x, y, n, u, pi, v, s, d
a
ja∈Ja , d
r
jr∈Jr , du
a
ca∈Ca , du
r
cr∈Cr).
Constraints (50)-(55) ensure that ˜MCS satisfies constraints (17)-(20): constraints (52)-(55) are
’dispatching’ constraints (50)-(51) to constraints (17)-(20). Therefore ˜MCS satisfies primal con-
ditions (2)-(13) and dual conditions (15)-(22). Condition (54) ensures that daj = 0 for j ∈ Jr, and
with (55), it shows that condition (39) implies the equality (1) = (14). By Observation 1, we can
then replace this equality by the needed complementarity conditions (23)-(37).
(II) Conversely let ˜MCS = (x, y, n, u, pi, v, s, daja∈Ja , d
r
jr∈Jr , du
a
ca∈Ca , du
r
cr∈Cr) be a point satisfying
constraints primal conditions (2)-(13), dual conditions (15)-(22), and complementarity conditions
(23)-(37), associated to a given block and MIC bid selection J = Ja∪Jr , C = Ca∪Cr. Observation
1 ensures that this point also satisfies the equality (1) = (14). Let us set additional values drj = 0,
for j ∈ Ja, also d
a
j = 0 for j ∈ Jr, and similarly du
a
c = 0 for c ∈ Cr , du
r
c = 0 for c ∈ Ca, giving
21
a point MCS = (x, y, n, u, pi, v, s, da, dr, dua, dur). The new point satisfies condition (39), since
only terms daj = 0, j ∈ Jr, du
a
c = 0 are added to the equality (1) = (14). It remains to verify
that all the remaining constraints defining UMFS are satisfied as well. All these additional values
trivially satisfy constraints (52)-(55). Therefore, it is needed to show that conditions (50)-(55)
are also satisfied for all j ∈ J, c ∈ C. Due to (24), in condition (17), sjr = 0 and we can set
drjr := Pjrλ
jr − Pjrpi without altering the satisfaction of any condition. Due to the price range
condition and the choice of the parameters Mj , these d
r
j , j ∈ Jr satisfy conditions (52), therefore
satisfied for all j ∈ J . In condition (18), sja , d
a
ja
can be redefined without modifying the values
of (sja − d
a
ja
) and hence without altering satisfaction of any other constraint. Due to the large
values of the parameters Mj, this again can be done so as to satisfy conditions (54) for j ∈ Ja,
hence for all j ∈ J . Then, (17)-(18), and the ’dispatcher conditions’ (52)-(54) imply (50). Finally,
concerning the analogue constraints related to the MIC bids, and first using Lemma 1 to set
duaca = 0 for all ca ∈ Ca, it is straightforward to show in a similar way that (19)-(20) together
with the Mc and the additional null values for part of the du
r (resp. dua) given above allow to
satisfy (51), (53).
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